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  2Abstract
1 
 
Using a sample of 32 developed and developing countries we analyze the 
empirical characteristics of Sudden Stops in capital flows and the relevance of 
balance-sheet effects in the likelihood of their occurrence.  We find that large real 
exchange rate (RER) fluctuations accompanied by Sudden Stops are basically an 
emerging market (EM) phenomenon.  Sudden Stops seem to come in bunches, 
grouping together countries that are different in many respects.  However, 
countries are similar in that they remain vulnerable to large RER fluctuations. 
This may be the case because countries are forced to make large adjustments in 
the absorption of tradable goods, and/or because the size of dollar liabilities in the 
banking system (i.e., domestic liability dollarization, or DLD) is large.  Openness, 
understood as a large supply of tradable goods that reduces leverage over the 
current account deficit, in combination with DLD, is a key determinant of the 
probability of Sudden Stops. The relationship between Openness and DLD in the 
determination of the probability of Sudden Stops is highly non-linear, implying 
that the interaction of high current account leverage and high dollarization may be 
a dangerous cocktail.  
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  3  41.  Introduction 
 
The sequence of financial crises that started with the so-called Tequila crisis in Mexico in 1994-
95 strongly suggests that these phenomena cannot simply be rationalized in terms of advanced-
country business cycle models.  More is at stake here.  In particular, these episodes are 
associated with a sharp contraction of international capital flows, or Sudden Stop, which may by 
itself have triggered the ensuing disruption. Sudden Stops are associated with large depreciations 
and major financial disruptions, leading to significantly lower rates of return, investment and 
growth. This is the point of view that will be elaborated on and subjected to empirical analysis in 
the present paper. 
  For starters, we would like to say a few words on alternative explanations of deep 
financial crises in Emerging Market economies (EMs) and give an intuitive presentation of the 
approach pursued in this paper.  A popular explanation for these crises used to be and, in some 
quarters still is, “lack of fiscal discipline.”  As the argument goes, crisis-prone EMs have a 
tendency to run high fiscal deficits, which eventually result in an unsustainable level of public 
debt.  Thus, there comes a time when lenders stop lending, forcing a major domestic adjustment.  
This explanation is very appealing for the 1980s Debt Crisis in Latin America, but finds little 
support in Asia.  For example, at the inception of its 1997 crisis, Korea’s public debt hovered 
around only 10 percent of GDP.  Moreover, debt levels in EMs are comparable to if not 
significantly lower than in advanced countries (e.g., Japan). 
Ardent believers in the fiscal view may not be entirely convinced by these observations, 
because during a financial crisis, the country as a whole, and the government in particular, lose 
access to international capital markets.  Thus, lenders behave as if they have smelled “something 
rotten in the State of Denmark.”  However, loss of access need not be the result of over-
indebtedness in the context of a good equilibrium, but rather the result of a bad equilibrium 
triggered by a Sudden Stop.  This Inverse Fiscal View finds support in the fact that Sudden Stop 
episodes tend to occur around the same time, and for countries exhibiting a variety of fiscal 
situations (indeed, the “bunching” of Sudden Stops is an important characteristic that we identify 
in the empirical section).  The most outstanding such episode was associated with the Russian 
  5August 1998 crisis, in which practically all EMs suffered serious Sudden Stops and an increase 
in country risk premiums.
2   
  The fiscal view started to be questioned during the 1997 Asian crises because these 
countries’ fiscal stances were much stronger than those in Latin America.
3  Even the IMF (1999) 
recognized that it made a mistake in calling for strong fiscal adjustment in that part of the world.  
As a result, attention shifted to other variables.  It did not take long for professional opinion to 
identify soft pegs as the likely culprit.  The Soft Peg view is that crisis countries engaged in 
unsustainable exchange rate pegs, which they were reluctant to abandon in a timely fashion, and 
only did so when hit by a balance-of-payments crisis.  This is an eminently sensible argument, 
but it falls short of providing an explanation for the ensuing real meltdown (collapse in output 
and employment, for instance).  Thus, our criticism follows the same lines that we have just 
utilized to question the relevance of the fiscal view, and it need not be repeated. 
  The view that will be spelled out in this paper is that EMs suffer from structural 
weaknesses that make them vulnerable—much more than advanced economies—to shocks.  In 
particular, we will zero in on shocks that are reflected in large changes in the real exchange rate 
(RER), i.e., the relative price of tradables with respect to nontradables.  The RER is a 
fundamental relative price that cuts across the fabric of the whole economy and involves a large 
variety of non-tradable goods.  Large variety, in turn, militates against the existence of effective 
state-contingent markets (e.g., futures markets) like those found in commodities markets.  There 
is, of course, nothing special about EMs in this respect.  However, what could make the 
variability of the RER deadly in EMs is the fact that many of them suffer from Domestic 
Liability Dollarization (DLD), i.e., a high incidence of foreign-exchange denominated 
obligations with the domestic banking system.
4  Hence, a rise in the RER (i.e., real currency 
                                                 
2 This view, incidentally, should not be taken as saying that public debt is not an important factor but, rather, that by 
and of itself, public debt is not enough to explain the devastation surrounding Sudden Stops in the last decade.  
Moreover, the fiscal view does offer a clear explanation of why fiscal adjustment (which typically does not exceed 4 
percent of GDP) should result in major economic disruption. 
3 However, in their explanation of the Asian crisis, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) emphasize the 
importance of prospective fiscal deficits related to implicit bailout guarantees due to a fragile banking sector.  This 
approach highlights a fundamental element of crisis that will prove to be a key determinant in our empirical 
findings, yet we emphasize the valuation effects on contingent liabilities in the event that a Sudden Stop 
materializes, and do not necessarily consider crises to be inevitable or fully expected events, as would be the case in 
the Burnside-Eichenbaum-Rebelo framework. 
4 For evidence on this phenomenon, see Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003), where Liability Dollarization 
is a salient component of a phenomenon labeled Original Sin.  In what follows we focus on domestic liability 
dollarization.  
  6depreciation) makes it more difficult to repay loans for firms producing nontradables.  This 
effect is particularly relevant because it may trigger substantial uncertainty about the solvency of 
the banking system as loans become non-performing, sometimes leading to bank runs in 
expectation of bank bankruptcies, which, in turn, almost inevitably affect the payments system 
and cause disruption in transactions and output.
5  Whether or not this effect is large depends, of 
course, on the size of the RER change, the stock of foreign-exchange denominated loans, and the 
ability of firms to switch production into tradables along their production possibilities frontier 
(which is likely to be difficult, particularly in the short run).  Thus, one could conjecture that real 
devaluations are particularly dangerous after a period in which there have been significant capital 
inflows (like the period from 1990 to 1996 in EMs).  The next section will present a simple 
model that helps to endogenize the RER.  It should be intuitive, however, that a Sudden Stop, 
being a sizable cut in credit, will bring about a fall in aggregate demand and, consequently, a 
possibly large increase in the RER.  Thus, a Sudden Stop may sow the seeds of a self-fulfilling 
crisis.  This is the main line that will be pursued in the paper.  However, it will be argued that 
equilibrium-multiplicity is not required in order to rationalize the existence of Sudden Stops.  
Thus, for example, Sudden Stops might be displayed in models in which the equilibrium set does 
not vary continuously with respect to fundamentals (Calvo, 2003). 
Our empirical findings support the view that potential RER fluctuations coupled with 
DLD are key determinants of the probability of experiencing Sudden Stops, thus highlighting the 
relevance of potential balance-sheet effects in explaining the likelihood of a crisis.  As will be 
discussed later, we argue that potential changes in the RER are linked to the size of the current 
account deficit prevailing before the materialization of a Sudden Stop.  Thus, our approach 
focuses on the impact of dollarization on the likelihood of a Sudden Stop, rather than on the 
consequences of dollarization and Sudden Stops on relevant variables such as economic growth, 
as in Edwards (2003), for example.    
Recent empirical literature has focused on alternative measures of crisis, whether 
currency crises (Frankel and Rose, 1996;
6 Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999;
7 Edwards, 2001;
8 
                                                 
5 In contrast to DLD, foreign liability dollarization (i.e., foreign-exchange obligations with foreign creditors), does 
not directly affect the domestic payments system, and those obligations are typically contracted by either firms 
engaged in tradable activities, or non-tradable firms whose revenues are indexed to the dollar, a characteristic that 
makes them less susceptible to RER fluctuations. 
6 Using a panel of 105 countries for the period 1970-1991, Frankel and Rose (1996) conclude that the current 
account has no significance in explaining currency crises.   
  7Arteta, 2003; Razin and Rubinstein, 2004
9) or current account reversals (Milesi-Ferretti and 
Razin, 2000; Edwards, 2003).  However, we believe that to the extent that many of the recent 
crises originated in credit shocks in international markets, as argued in Calvo (1999), measures 
of crisis should be more closely linked to large and unexpected capital account movements rather 
than to measures that focus on large nominal currency fluctuations or current account reversals.  
Besides, current account and exchange rate behavior may be more affected by policy choices 
than Sudden Stops.  Moreover, Sudden Stops may imply quite different timings for the onset of a 
crisis compared to exchange rate crises or current account reversals.
10 
Our strategy concentrates on the valuation effects of domestic dollarized liabilities (or, 
more specifically, on liabilities in terms of tradable goods), so our interest lies in real rather than 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations.  Furthermore, we do not focus on the current account itself, 
but rather on the percentage fall in the absorption of tradable goods, which, as will be argued 
later, may represent a summary statistic for the rise in the RER following a Sudden Stop.   
Moreover, we highlight DLD, a phenomenon not considered in previous empirical studies of 
crises, with the exception of Arteta (2003), who explores the significance of Liability 
Dollarization in explaining the probability of a currency crisis.  Interestingly, he finds no 
significant role for Liability Dollarization.  This result is not incompatible with our findings, 
given that we do not focus on currency crises, and, as stated earlier, the timing of currency crises 
may be quite different from that of Sudden Stops.  Additionally, our measure of dollarization is 
different in that it includes not only deposits but also foreign borrowing, something that is 
particularly relevant for EMs when trying to proxy for credit awarded in foreign currency.
11  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a model that identifies the 
variables that determine the change in the RER, which is at the heart of our crisis framework. 
Section 3 develops an empirical definition and characterization of Sudden Stops.  Section 4 
focuses on an empirical analysis of the determinants of Sudden Stops, following a panel Probit 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) implicitly introduce a link between current account performance and currency 
crises by incorporating the growth rate of imports and exports in their analysis.  They select the latter as a relevant 
early warning indicator of currency crises based on the noise-to-signal ratio properties of the series. 
8 This analysis does find that under some definitions of currency crisis, and particularly excluding African countries, 
current account deficits are a significant determinant of the probability of experiencing currency crises. 
9 Razin and Rubinstein (2004) focus on large RER swings to define a crisis.  
10 According to our definition, for example, Argentina’s Sudden Stop starts in May of 1999, whereas the currency 
crisis only hits in February of 2002.  
11 Our sample of countries is also different from that of Arteta (2003). 
  8approach.  Section 5 concludes with a description of our main findings and future lines of 
research.    
 
2.  Basic Models 
 
The link between shocks to the current account and financial variables has been explored in the 
literature and can be traced back to work by Rodríguez (1980) and Dornbusch and Fischer 
(1980).
12  In these studies, which rely on a two-asset portfolio model (the assets are domestic and 
foreign currency), the path of the nominal exchange rate depends on fluctuations in the trade 
balance.  Given that the accumulation of foreign assets is determined by trade balance 
performance, the current exchange rate depends on both the path of money supply and the path 
of the trade balance.  Shocks to the latter with sufficient persistence can therefore have effects on 
the spot exchange rate.
13  However, the motivation of these models is anchored in the persistence 
of structural trade deficits as an explanation for exchange rate movements.  We focus instead on 
shocks to the financing of the current account.
14  Consider the following demand function for 
nontradables: 
 
h = α + β rer + δ z  (1) 
 
where h = log H, z = log Z, rer = log RER, H and Z are the demand for nontradables (or home 
goods) and tradables, and α, β, and δ are parameters.
15  Let the current account deficit be denoted 
by CAD.  By definition, 
 
CAD = Z – Y + S,  (2) 
 
                                                 
12 The literature on current account behavior goes much further back in time, focusing mainly on the price elasticity 
aspects of devaluation on the trade balance.  An excellent summary of the different views on the current account can 
be found in Edwards (2001). 
13 Calvo and Rodríguez (1977) construct a similar model that includes non-tradable goods to analyze RER 
determination under monetary policy shocks.  Although shocks akin to Sudden Stops are not discussed there, they 
can be accommodated as an upward shift in the rate of accumulation of foreign assets (the equivalent of the current 
account balance as a share of foreign assets analyzed in Rodríguez, 1980), leading to a rise in the RER. 
14 More recent models, such as Izquierdo (1999), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), or Arellano and Mendoza 
(2002), have revisited the issue of shocks to current account financing by looking at collateral constraints.  Shocks to 
collateral requirements, or to the terms of trade, can lead to substantial overshooting of the RER, as the value of 
assets used as collateral may overshoot downwards due to inefficient production levels when credit constraints bind 
following an external shock.  
15 This equation could be derived from first principles if H and X are identified with consumption of nontradables 
and tradables, the intertemporal utility function is separable, and the utility function is iso-elastic in H and X. 
  9where Y is output of tradables and S are factor payments, remittances abroad, etc.   
Now consider a Sudden Stop episode.  Typically, prior to these episodes the CAD is 
positive, and as a result of the Sudden Stop it goes down to zero, or even runs into negative 
territory (this is documented in Calvo and Reinhart, 2000, for EMs, and in Calvo, Izquierdo and 
Talvi, 2002, for Latin American countries following the Russian 1998 crisis).  Moreover, it is 
worth noting that these are not common events.  As shown in Appendix Table 1, as a general 
rule, changes in the trade balance display substantial persistence when the latter is approximated 
by an AR(1) process, both for EMs and developed economies.
16  
  Abstracting from remittances, and momentarily keeping international reserves constant, it 
can be argued that a country could not be forced into a Sudden Stop larger than the initial trade 
balance (or initial CAD if it is too costly not to pay interest on outstanding debt).  Reserves losses 
could momentarily cushion the blow, but as the Sudden Stop phenomenon lingers on, 
international reserves will be depleted.  Actually, that is the general rule in Sudden Stop episodes 
that are accompanied by a balance-of-payments crisis (which will be the focus of our empirical 
analysis).  Thus, as a first approximation, we will center on the case in which the CAD is driven 
down to zero.
17  In that case, given Y and S,  
 
– ∆Z = CAD  (3) 
thus, 
– ∆Z / Z = CAD / Z  (4) 
 
Taking first differences in equation (1), approximating the relative change in Z by its first 
difference in logs, and assuming that the supply of nontradables is constant, we obtain in 
equilibrium (i.e., setting H = supply of nontradables, assumed a constant, for simplicity) 
 
.
Z
CAD
rer
β
δ
= ∆  (5) 
                                                 
16 Monthly, seasonally-adjusted data on imports and exports were used to calculate the trade balance for the set of 
countries included in Appendix Table 1 (these countries will be used later on in our empirical analysis, see section 
IV).  Changes in the trade balance are approximated by a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process.  On average, 
the estimated coefficient yields 0.38 for EMs, and 0.5 for developed countries. 
17 Therefore, when we compute changes in CAD, the latter will be equivalent to (minus) the CAD prevailing in the 
previous period, i.e., ∆CADt = CADt – CADt-1 =  – CADt-1.  For convenience, we drop the time subscript in the 
equations that follow.  
  10 
In words, equation (5) states that the relative change in the real exchange rate is proportional to 
the prevailing CAD prior to the Sudden Stop, relative to the absorption of tradables.  This 
equation is not intended to model the actual change in the equilibrium real exchange rate but, 
rather, that part of the total change that is likely to be very difficult for the country to prevent.  A 
debtor country could stop paying its debt, but, as a general rule, it cannot force new money from 
its creditors.  That is the assumption behind equation (5).  We are now ready to complete the 
framework that will help to rationalize Sudden Stops as defined in the empirical section, 
containing a largely unexpected component.   
Consider a scenario in which a shock is spread from one country to other regions because 
of prevailing rules in capital market transactions (such as margin calls) that are unrelated to 
country fundamentals.  Such a possibility is discussed in Calvo (1999), where it is argued that a 
liquidity shock to informed investors due to adverse developments in one country
18 may trigger 
sales of assets from other countries in their portfolio in order to restore liquidity.  Now add to 
this framework a set of uninformed investors who face a signal-extraction problem in that they 
cannot observe whether sales of the informed are motivated by lower returns on projects or by 
the informed facing margin calls.  In this context, uninformed investors may easily interpret the 
informed investors staying out of the market for EM securities or massive asset sales as an 
indication of lower returns and decide to get rid of their holdings as well, even though the cause 
for informed investors’ sales was indeed due to margin calls.
19  When this occurs, a set of 
countries with no ties to the country at the epicenter of the crisis will be exposed to a large and 
unexpected liquidity shock, making their equilibrium real exchange rate rise according to 
equation (5).  Thus, if the relative change in RER is large and the economy is liability-dollarized, 
then massive bankruptcy will likely ensue, and the economy will land in a bad equilibrium 
characterized by a Sudden Stop with output contraction and low debt repayment capacity.   
The latter can be rationalized in different ways.  For example, although they do not deal 
with bankruptcies, models such as Izquierdo (1999) or Arellano and Mendoza (2002) help 
rationalize the effects of changes in the RER on output via credit contraction, where the relevant 
price is that of non-tradable collateral relative to the tradable good being produced.  Aghion, 
                                                 
18  Say, a margin call due to the fall in the price of asset holdings from a particular country. 
19 This can occur when the variance of returns to projects is sufficiently high relative to the variance of the liquidity 
shock of informed investors. 
  11Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001) exploit the fact that with incomplete pass-through from exchange 
rates to domestic prices, currency depreciation leads to a decline in net worth due to the increase 
in the debt burden of domestic firms indebted in foreign currency, thus reducing investment by 
constrained firms as well as output levels in future periods.  The associated fall in future money 
demand and consequent future currency depreciation, coupled with arbitrage in the foreign 
exchange rate market, implies that currency depreciation must take place in the current period as 
well, opening the door for expectational shocks that could push an economy into a bad (low 
output) equilibrium.  Therefore, given the damaging effect of RER fluctuations on balance 
sheets, output and repayment capacity, it can be argued that the probability of a Sudden Stop cum 
output contraction will be an increasing function of CAD/Z and the degree of Liability 
Dollarization, among other possible variables.  This is the central conjecture that will be put to 
the test in the next sections. 
The simple theory outlined above stresses the possibility that a current account deficit (a 
proxy of unavoidable current account adjustment when the country is tested by the capital 
market) combined with Liability Dollarization will bring about objective conditions that generate 
a Sudden Stop.  Notice that in this context the stock of debt is, in principle, not central, unless 
one can argue that it changes the size of the unavoidable current account adjustment when the 
country is tested.  This point is worth keeping in mind because our empirical results suggest that 
total debt is not a key factor behind Sudden Stop.  On the other hand, once a Sudden Stop occurs, 
how long financial turmoil will last should quite sensibly be expected to depend on total debt, a 
phenomenon that appears to be supported in part by the data. 
 
A Note on Models 
   
Sudden Stops could be rationalized in terms of models displaying a unique equilibrium.  It may 
suffice that the equilibrium outcome be a discontinuous function of fundamentals.  This feature 
could actually be derived in conventional models in the presence of externalities, where if more 
than one equilibrium were to be displayed, uniqueness is recovered by assuming, for example, 
that the best equilibrium will be chosen (a Panglossian assumption
20).  This is a natural 
assumption in the present context if one is prepared to assume that the IMF and other multilateral 
                                                 
20 “All is the best possible,” says Master Pangloss in Voltaire’s Candide. 
  12financial institutions perform a good job in helping countries to avoid crises that would be 
preventable at very little cost. 
  In Calvo (2003), there exists a critical level of government debt beyond which the 
economy plunges into a bad equilibrium.  The transition from the good to the bad equilibrium 
displays Sudden Stop features.  Although the model assumes perfect foresight, it could be used 
to depict a situation in which the economy is hit by a totally unexpected shock that pushes it into 
the bad equilibrium.  Thus, this model does not rely on equilibrium multiplicity, but it 
nonetheless provides some insight on a possible cause of a Sudden Stop, namely, public sector 
indebtedness.  Calvo (2003) is a non-monetary model, where public debt is denominated in terms 
of tradables.  Thus, Liability Dollarization is actually assumed for the entire debt, implying that 
the higher the degree of Liability Dollarization (measured by the public debt/output ratio), the 
higher the probability that a given negative shock will generate a Sudden Stop, helping to 
rationalize the empirical results discussed later on in the paper.
21 
  Before closing this section, a word about transitory or non-credible policy models (see 
Calvo, 1996) is in order.  Those models would be able to rationalize a large cut in capital inflows 
(even unexpected cuts, as in Calvo and Drazen, 1998), and would be in line with Burnside, 
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001).  However, we are not enthusiastic about this as a stand-alone 
interpretation because of the high degree of bunching displayed by Sudden Stop crises.  In these 
models, the Sudden Stop would be driven by policies that suffer a sudden reversal because they 
are unsustainable.  Thus, bunching implies that many countries find themselves in this 
predicament at about the same time, and that policies are pushed to their sustainability limit in 
regions as different as Latin America and Asia. 
 
3.  Sudden Stops and Large Real Currency Depreciations 
 
We start our empirical analysis with the identification and characterization of Sudden Stops.  
Specifically, we explore: 1) How EMs compare in terms of the frequency of Sudden Stops 
relative to developed countries; 2) Whether large real currency depreciations are inevitably 
                                                 
21 Uniqueness could also be obtained along the lines suggested by Morris and Shin (1998).  Consider the limit case 
in which informational noise (ε in their notation) goes to zero, and let currency devaluation after crisis be an 
increasing function of the degree of Liability Dollarization.  Then, it can be shown that the likelihood of a crisis as a 
result of deterioration in fundamentals (θ in their notation) would be higher, the higher the degree of Liability 
Dollarization.  
  13associated with unexpected reversals in capital inflows, or whether this is mostly a characteristic 
of EMs; 3) Whether Sudden Stops precede large real currency depreciations, or vice versa; 4) 
Whether Sudden Stops occur simultaneously for a large set of countries, probably signaling 
disruptions in world capital markets and contagion, or whether they are indeed isolated events. 
Given our discussion in the previous section, and following Calvo (1998b), we look for 
measures of a Sudden Stop that reflect large and unexpected falls in capital inflows that have 
costly consequences in terms of disruptions in economic activity, a central element in the 
characterization of this type of event given its impact on repayment capacity. 
  In order to make the concept of Sudden Stop operational, we first define a Sudden Stop 
as a phase that meets the following conditions:   
•  It contains at least one observation where the year-on-year fall in capital flows 
lies at least two standard deviations below its sample mean (this addresses the 
“unexpected” requirement of a Sudden Stop).
22 
•  The Sudden Stop phase ends once the annual change in capital flows exceeds 
one standard deviation below its sample mean. This will generally introduce 
persistence, a common fact of Sudden Stops. 
•  Moreover, for the sake of symmetry, the start of a Sudden Stop phase is 
determined by the first time the annual change in capital flows falls one 
standard deviation below the mean.
23 
Notice that there is an important difference between this concept of crisis and the concept 
of crisis used in other studies that focus on measures such as a fixed current account deficit 
threshold as a share of GDP. In short, in line with the theoretical arguments outlined in the 
previous section, our definition accounts for the volatility of capital flow fluctuations of each 
particular country at each point in time in deciding whether an event is “large and unexpected.”  
If anything, our concept of crisis will tend to include episodes that would otherwise not qualify 
for crisis when using measures such as a fixed current account deficit threshold.  This is so 
                                                 
22 Both the first and second moments of the series are calculated each period using an expanding window with a 
minimum of 24 (months of) observations and a start date fixed at January 1990.  This is intended to capture a 
learning process or updating of the behavior of the series. 
23 As a result, a Sudden Stop phase starts with a fall in capital flows exceeding one standard deviation, followed by a 
fall of two standard deviations.  The process lasts until the change in capital flows is bigger than minus one standard 
deviation.      
  14because the latter would exclude many crisis episodes in developed countries simply because 
their volatility is smaller. 
To maximize the chances of detecting Sudden Stops, we work with monthly data, since 
lower frequency data may hide the origin of these episodes.  Given that capital account 
information is typically not available at this frequency, we construct a capital flow proxy by 
netting out the trade balance from changes in foreign reserves
24 (both net factor income and 
current transfers are thus included in our measure of capital flows, but since they represent 
mostly interest payments on long-term debt, they should not vary so substantially as to introduce 
significant spurious volatility into our capital flows measure).  Changes in this measure of capital 
flows are measured on a yearly basis to avoid seasonal fluctuations.  We work with a sample of 
32 countries, 15 EMs and 17 developed economies for the period 1990-2001 (see the Data 
Appendix for details).
25 
We also construct a Sudden Stop measure that builds upon the one previously described 
by adding a criterion of costly disruption in economic activity, defined as a contraction in 
output.
26  We do this because, in many cases, a fall in capital flows may just be the natural 
consequence of a positive shock that works as alternative financing, namely, a terms-of-trade 
shock.  Thus, we would be including a phenomenon that could be dismissed as a crisis event and 
is therefore not relevant for our analysis.  As a matter of fact, when comparing Sudden Stop 
episodes picked up by our first criterion, but not by our second criterion, we find that 61 percent 
of the time these episodes coincide with an increase in the terms of trade
27 (see Appendix Table 
2).  For this reason, we decided to work with our second definition of Sudden Stop.  
                                                 
24 See the Data Appendix for definitions and sources of these variables.  All series are measured in constant 1995 US 
dollars.  
25 The first two years of observations are lost, given that such information is used to construct initial standard 
deviations.  
26 Alternatively, one could replace this absolute criterion with some relative measure of output fall that takes into 
account the economy’s track record.  To address this issue, we defined a “relatively large output fall” as one 
displaying an output fall exceeding two standard deviations below the mean change in (the log of) output.   
Interestingly, however, due to the high volatility in output growth in EMs (even for periods of positive growth), this 
criterion turned out to be much more stringent than the absolute output fall, as it would require falls in output of 
such a large magnitude to highlight a crisis that it would ignore most of the crisis episodes in our sample of 
countries.  
27 Also, when using the first criterion, Probit estimations of the type described in section IV yield the result that an 
increase in the terms of trade would lead to an increase in the probability of experiencing a Sudden Stop, something 
that is clearly picking up the mechanical negative correlation between capital flow changes and terms of trade 
growth.  Estimations performed with our alternative measure, including costly disruption of economic activity, 
predict exactly the opposite, i.e., terms of trade growth impacts negatively on the probability of a Sudden Stop.     
  15Results are presented in Figures 1 and 2, for EMs and developed countries, respectively, 
showing the binary variable describing periods of Sudden Stop, together with a binary variable 
indicating periods of a large increase in the RER (see the Data Appendix for details).  For EMs, 
Sudden Stop signals are mostly lit around the Tequila (1994), East Asian (1997), and Russian 
(1998) crises.  Sudden Stops in developed countries are centered on the ERM (1993) crisis.  
These results imply that there are periods of Sudden Stop “bunching,” suggesting contagion 
effects across countries. This is clearly shown in Figure 3, which measures the number of 
Sudden Stop episodes taking place simultaneously, both for our EM and developed country 
samples.  Bunching is particularly striking around the time of the Russian crisis of August 1998.  
Within a window stretching one year before and after the Russian crisis, countries like 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Korea, Peru, Thailand, Turkey, and the 
Philippines were all in a Sudden Stop phase.  Out of this sample, five countries, namely, 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Turkey, entered a period of Sudden Stop either in 1998 
or 1999.  Countries in this group were quite heterogeneous in terms of their fiscal stance and 
other macroeconomic measures, making it hard to argue that there was a common flaw in 
fundamentals driving these episodes, other than the fact that they are all EMs.
28  This suggests 
that all these episodes were not necessarily crises just waiting to happen, although there may be 
factors that made them more prone to crisis, an issue that we will analyze in the following 
section. 
                                                 
28 For a detailed treatment of the Latin American episodes see Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002). 
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Figure 1. Real Exchange Rate Depreciation Dummy (20%) 
vs. Sudden Stop Dummy in Emerging Markets, 1992-2001 
 
 
 
Note: Gray areas indicate Sudden Stop periods.  Periods in between black lines indicate intervals 
of large RER depreciation. 
  17Figure 2. Real Exchange Rate Depreciation Dummy (20%) vs. Sudden Stop Dummy in 
Developed Economies, 1992-2001 
 
 
 
Note: Gray areas indicate Sudden Stop periods.  Periods in between black lines indicate intervals 
of large RER depreciation. 
  18Figure 3. The Bunching of Sudden Stops Events: 
Emerging Markets vs. Developed Economies 
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Note: The sample of countries includes 15 EMs and 17 developed countries. 
 
Next, we discuss a set of relevant statistics regarding Sudden Stops that we summarize in 
Table 1.  It is particularly interesting to note that for EMs only 37 percent of all depreciation 
episodes were not associated with a Sudden Stop.  This figure is even smaller (25 percent) once 
we exclude South Africa, which captures three out of the seven episodes of depreciation without 
Sudden Stops in EMs.  South Africa is a particularly interesting case, given that it was identified 
in previous work by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) as one of the few EMs without “fear of floating,” 
resembling in this respect the behavior of developed economies.  Results change dramatically for 
developed countries, where 83 percent of all depreciation episodes were not associated with a 
Sudden Stop.  This is a clear indication that, unlike the case of EMs, capital markets for 
developed countries are more likely to remain open during currency crises.  Within the 
developed-country sample, newcomers to the European Union (Portugal and Spain) experienced 
half of the Sudden Stop episodes. This evidence suggests that Sudden Stops are typically events 
  19associated with EMs, and sometimes even with countries that have recently graduated into the 
group of highly developed economies. 
The next question that we address is whether, in episodes in which large real currency 
depreciation lies in the neighborhood
29 of a Sudden Stop, capital flow reversal comes first, or 
depreciation comes first.  Our sample does not provide a clear-cut answer, but there is some 
evidence that capital flow reversals may precede high real depreciation, as indicated by the fact 
that 63 percent of the time capital reversals come first.  This figure increases slightly (to 67 
percent) for EMs (see Table 1).
30 
 
Table 1. Sudden Stop Statistics 
 
In % of total 
  Emerging 
Markets
Developed 
Economies 
Devaluations associated with Sudden Stop  63 17 
 Of which: First Sudden Stop, then  42 9 
                  First devaluation, then Sudden  21 9 
Devaluations not associated with Sudden Stop  37 83 
Note: The total number of large devaluations is 19 in emerging markets and 23 in developed 
economies. 
 
Another element of the characterization of Sudden Stop episodes that we are interested in 
is the behavior of key macroeconomic variables at the time of a Sudden Stop.  In particular, we 
focus our attention on the performance of real interest rates, foreign reserves and the current 
account balance.  Appendix Table 3 shows the average behavior of real money market interest 
rates from trough to peak in a two-year window centered at the beginning of a Sudden Stop 
episode, both for EMs and developed countries, as well as for the whole sample.  Clearly, real 
interest rates rise sharply in the neighborhood of a Sudden Stop (on average, 3,900 basis points), 
particularly for EMs (on average, 4,670 basis points).  Thus, we conjecture that Sudden Stops are 
mainly capturing supply-side shifts in capital markets. 
  Let us now examine the behavior of foreign reserves in the neighborhood of Sudden 
Stops.  We do this in order to check to what extent countries have used reserves to smooth out 
                                                 
29 Defined as a one-year-window before and after a Sudden Stop.  
30 Granger-causality-type tests of the effects of a Sudden Stop on depreciation and vice versa (using a Probit model 
to measure the joint significance of depreciation lags on the probability of a Sudden Stop, and another Probit to 
measure the joint significance of Sudden Stop lags on depreciation) do not provide a conclusive answer.   
  20the effect of a Sudden Stop on the current account deficit.  Even though this is in principle a 
losing strategy if Sudden Stop events are highly persistent (reserves will typically not be 
sufficient to sustain a current account deficit for a long time), many countries have engaged in 
reserve loss strategies to sustain exchange rates and avoid abrupt current account adjustment, 
perhaps in the hope that Sudden Stops would be reversed.  Indeed, as discussed in Calvo (2003), 
under a Sudden Stop, a Central Bank may have incentives to hand its reserves to credit-
constrained non-tradable corporate sectors via credit expansion (a strategy that requires keeping 
a quasi-fixed exchange rate). As shown in Appendix Table 3, there is a substantial reserve loss 
from peak to trough within the Sudden Stop phase (on average, 35.7 percent) for every country 
in our sample.  
  We also keep track of current account balance behavior in times of Sudden Stops.  The 
important point to notice here is that Sudden Stops bring along abrupt current account 
adjustment, reflecting the disruption in international credit markets.  This is presented in 
Appendix Table 3.  As expected, the toll of capital reversals and current account adjustment is 
much more substantial in EMs than in developed countries.  The average increase from trough to 
peak in the current account balance
31 is of 6.1 percent of GDP in EMs, while it is only 1.1 
percent in developed economies.  These results are akin to those found in Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000). 
 
4. Determinants of Sudden Stops: Empirical Analysis 
 
Having examined the empirical characteristics of Sudden Stops, we now turn to a search for 
Sudden Stop determinants.  The theories discussed in Section 2 suggest a set of factors that 
exacerbate an economy’s vulnerability to Sudden Stops:  The degree of domestic liability 
dollarization (both in the private and public sectors), as well as the sensitivity of the RER to 
capital flow reversals, which is related to the degree of openness (measured by the size of the 
supply of tradable goods relative to demand of tradable goods).  The latter becomes clear once 
we examine equation (5), which shows that the size of the increase in the RER
32 depends on the 
percentage fall in the absorption of tradables needed to close the current account gap (CAD/Z).  
                                                 
31 In a two-year interval centered at the beginning of a Sudden Stop. 
32 An increase means a real depreciation of the currency. 
  21As a matter of fact, the less leveraged the absorption of tradable goods is, the smaller will be the 
effect on the RER.  To see this, rewrite CAD/Z as: 
 
ω − =
−
− =
+ −
= 1 1
Z
S Y
Z
S Y Z
Z
CAD
  (6) 
 
where ω is defined as  () Z S Y / − = ω .  It is evident that the more open an economy is, (defining 
openness as a higher value of the supply of tradables ( ) Y ), the smaller will be the financing from 
abroad (or leverage) of the absorption of tradables, ( ) Z S Y / Z + − .  Following Calvo, Izquierdo 
and Talvi (2002), we rely on 1-ω for our estimations, given that it represents a key summary 
variable to assess the impact of a Sudden Stop on relative prices, since it measures the leveraged 
portion of the absorption of tradables.  Thus, higher values of 1-ω mean that a country relies less 
on its own financing of the absorption of tradables, and is therefore more vulnerable to RER 
depreciations stemming from closure of the current account gap.   
  In order to construct a measure of 1-ω for each of the 32 countries in our sample, we need 
to obtain a value for the absorption of tradable goods (Z), which is composed of imports plus a 
fraction of the supply of tradable goods.  We do this by proxying tradable output by the sum of 
agriculture plus industrial output, i.e., we exclude services from total output (for these and all 
other variables used in this section, see the Data Appendix for details on definitions and sources).  
Next, we obtain the fraction of tradable output consumed domestically by subtracting exports 
from tradable output, and add imports to the latter in order to get a measure of Z.  Having 
computed values for Z, and using CAD data, we get values for 1-ω as indicated by equation (6).           
  We use as a benchmark a panel Probit model
33 
34 that estimates the probability of falling 
into a Sudden Stop regime as a function of lagged values of 1-ω and DLD, controlling for time 
effects using yearly dummies.  In order to reduce endogeneity issues, and given that many of the 
variables used in our estimations come at an annual frequency, we switch to yearly data.
35  DLD 
is defined as BIS reporting banks’ local asset positions in foreign currency as a share of GDP.  
Such data is not available for EMs, so we construct a proxy by adding up dollar deposits and 
                                                 
33 We use random effects to control for heterogeneity across panel members. 
34 The use of a Probit model and the construction of a dichotomous Sudden Stop variable are due to our belief that 
large and unexpected capital flow reversals have non-linear effects, as they trigger substantial balance-sheet 
fluctuations that may lead to serious credit constraints or plain bankruptcies.  An alternative, which is not explored 
in this paper, would be to use regime-switching models. 
35 Thus, lagged observations are one year apart from contemporaneous observations.   
  22bank foreign borrowing as a share of GDP.  Under the assumption that banks are matched by 
currency in their assets and liabilities, then this measure should be a good proxy for liability 
dollarization.
36  Following related literature on determinants of crises, we also include a set of 
macroeconomic control variables, which we describe later.  We lag variables
37 to avoid 
endogeneity problems, and we are particularly interested in lagged ω because it proxies for the 
potential change in relative prices that could occur were the country to face a Sudden Stop, 
something that would not be conveyed by contemporaneous ω once the current account gap is 
closed and relative prices have adjusted. 
Regression results, presented in Appendix Table 4, indicate that both 1-ω and DLD are 
significant at the 1 percent level in almost every specification, underscoring the relevance of ω as 
an indicator of potential Sudden Stops, taken here as a signal of the potential change in relative 
prices that could materialize at the time of a Sudden Stop.  These results withstand the inclusion 
of a set of other control variables, such as the ratio of foreign reserves to CAD (a measure of the 
ability to finance CAD, at least initially), private sector credit growth, total public debt, FDI and 
the public sector balance (all expressed as shares of GDP), and terms of trade growth, as well as 
two different measures of exchange rate flexibility, and an EM dummy.  
Having accounted for the relevance of ω and DLD in explaining the likelihood of a 
Sudden Stop, we now focus on their interaction, which is particularly amenable to Probit models.  
We find that the effects of ω on the probability of a Sudden Stop crucially depend on the degree 
of DLD.  Low values of ω (high leverage of CAD) imply a higher probability of Sudden Stop, 
but this is particularly so for dollarized economies.  Consider, for example, the effects of varying 
ω on the probability of a Sudden Stop, keeping all other variables constant at their means, except 
for DLD, which could be low (5
th percentile in our sample), average, or high (95
th percentile).  
This is represented in Figure 4 (panel A).
38  For small values of ω, there are substantial 
differences in the probability of a Sudden Stop depending on whether DLD is low or high.  Take, 
for example, any two countries with a value of ω of 0.76 (the lowest measure of ω in our 
sample), and assume that the first country is highly dollarized (medium-dash line), whereas the 
second country is not (solid line).  The probability of a Sudden Stop in the highly dollarized 
                                                 
36 Data on dollar deposits is mainly that in Honohan and Shi (2002), see the Data Appendix for a full description. 
37 Except for terms-of-trade growth, which is included contemporaneously. 
38 We use model (1) in Table 4 of the Appendix to construct this figure. 
  23country exceeds that of the less-dollarized country by about 0.65.  Now evaluate this difference 
for the same two countries when ω is equal to 1 (i.e., when CAD = 0).  The difference in the 
probability of a Sudden Stop is now only about 0.30, about half the difference at the lower ω 
level.  The high non-linearity described by the data implies that low ω and high dollarization can 
be a very dangerous cocktail, as potential balance sheet effects become highly relevant in 
determining the probability of a Sudden Stop.   
The effects of DLD on the probability of a Sudden Stop are particularly important for 
EMs.  As of the end of 2001, 78 percent of EMs in our sample lay above the dollarization 
median, whereas 76 percent of developed countries lay below the dollarization median.  This 
helps in rationalizing why the EM dummy included in our estimations turned out not to be 
significant, as dollarization seems to capture appropriately a key difference between these 
groups. 
 
Figure 4. Probability of a Sudden Stop for Different Values of ω 
and Domestic Liability Dollarization in the Average Country 
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  24We now turn to the remaining set of variables used as controls in our regressions.  First, 
we focus on two measures of exchange rate regime flexibility that were used alternatively in the 
estimations presented in Appendix Tables 4 and 5.  These measures are those constructed by 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002), who classify the flexibility of exchange rate regimes 
based on exchange rate volatility, exchange-rate-changes volatility, and foreign reserves 
volatility.  The first, narrower measure, classifies regimes into floating regimes, intermediate 
regimes, and fixed regimes, while the second measure extends this classification to five 
categories.  This first pass suggests that neither of these two measures of exchange rate flexibility 
turns out to be significant for the whole sample, although results are different for the EM group 
when we estimate later on a linear probability model that controls for endogeneity due to 
unobserved common factors.
39  Although this finding may seem puzzling, it can be explained by 
the fact that the loss of access to international credit is a real phenomenon with real effects such 
as output contraction, which in principle does not rely on the behavior of nominal variables.  
Indeed, the framework presented in Section 2 does not rely on any particular nominal setup to 
explain the change in relative prices following a Sudden Stop, which would materialize under 
both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes.  As a matter of fact, models that provide a full-
fledged version of the effects of Sudden Stops on output such as Izquierdo (1999), Arellano and 
Mendoza (2002), and Calvo (2003) are concerned with real effects that are independent of 
nominal arrangements.  Of course, this does not rule out very different short-term dynamics, 
which are likely to be dependent on nominal arrangements, as was evidenced by the very 
dissimilar behavior of several Latin American economies after the Sudden Stop triggered by the 
Russian crisis of 1998.  Even though all countries hit by Sudden Stops eventually experienced 
substantial real currency depreciation and output loss, the dynamics were very different for 
countries like Colombia, for example, which quickly depreciated its currency and withstood the 
real shock sooner, and Argentina, which took much longer to correct the resulting RER 
misalignment.
40 Other macroeconomic variables that we added for control, including the ratio of 
foreign reserves to CAD, credit growth, FDI, government balance, terms of trade growth, and 
public sector debt, do not turn out to be significant at the 5 percent level.
41  This is consistent 
with other empirical work on the determinants of crises that do not find a strong relationship 
                                                 
39 See the section on robustness checks and Appendix Table 9. 
40 See Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002) for a more detailed discussion.  
41 At least when not controlling for potential endogeneity of ω.  This issue is addressed below. 
  25between most of these variables and the probability of a crisis.  Of particular interest to us was 
public sector debt, because one would expect that highly indebted countries would be more 
susceptible to capital flow reversals, as suggested by Calvo (2003).
42 We tried four different 
versions of total public sector debt: public debt as a share of GDP, the debt-to-revenue ratio,
43 the 
debt-to-GDP ratio scaled by its de-trended standard deviation, and the debt-to-GDP ratio 
interacted with an EM dummy.  The last three transformations attempt to capture the fact that 
developed countries are able to sustain higher levels of debt relative to GDP because they have a 
higher tax base to support the debt-servicing burden, or because the demand for public bonds is 
less volatile, or simply because other factors (including their reputation in terms of willingness or 
ability to pay) fare better than for EMs.  Despite all these plausible considerations, public debt in 
any of these variations turns out not to be statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  We also 
worked with the external debt-to-exports ratio to capture the ability to support the external debt-
servicing burden as an explanatory variable, with similar results.  Finally, in the same vein as our 
DLD variable, we included a proxy of public dollar-denominated debt as a share of GDP to 
account for potential balance sheet effects in the public sector.  This variable also turns out not to 
be significant at the 10 percent confidence level. To control for the fact that instead of public 
debt, it may be total foreign debt that is responsible for determining the likelihood of Sudden 
Stop, we also constructed a proxy for total debt by adding up current account balances from 1982 
onwards.
44  This figure was later normalized by either GDP or government revenues.  These 
measures did not turn out significant either.  These results suggest that public debt or total 
foreign debt stocks are not clear factors that determine the likelihood of a Sudden Stop.  The fact 
that ω as well as domestic DLD remain significant, while debt measures do not, suggests that 
valuation effects, coupled with the materialization of contingent liabilities resulting from public 
sector takeover of private debts with the financial system may be key in explaining the likelihood 
of a Sudden Stop.
45 This assertion is particularly relevant for cases like Korea, where public 
sector debt represented only 10 percent of GDP prior to its 1997 Sudden Stop, before 
quadrupling once the financial sector bailout was added to the fiscal burden. 
                                                 
42 See also Section 2 above for a discussion of this issue.   
43 For space reasons, only this variable is reported in our estimations.  Other estimations are available upon request.   
44 We chose 1982 as the starting date because several EMs defaulted on their obligations prior to 1982.  Thus, it 
would be incorrect to add current account balances prior to this date, since they were not necessarily paid off. 
45 Models such as Calvo (2003) should therefore be extended to include a financial sector as well as debt in both 
tradable and non-tradable goods. 
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Robustness Checks 
Using the EM Sample.  In order to address the fact that all efforts to account for debt as a 
determinant of the likelihood of a Sudden Stop were unsuccessful, and that this failure could be 
due in part to problems in accounting for differences between EMs and developed countries 
regarding the size of debt levels deemed sustainable by capital markets, we repeat our 
estimations, this time only for the EM group.  Interestingly, we confirm the same results reached 
with the full data set (see Appendix Table 5).  Both ω and domestic DLD remain significant at 
the 5 percent level, whereas the ratio of total debt to fiscal revenues does not (as well as all other 
measures of public debt mentioned above), even after controlling for the same set of 
macroeconomic variables used in previous estimations, thus indicating the robustness of ω and 
DLD to the choice of panel members. 
 
Further Addressing Endogeneity.  One issue we have not yet fully covered is that there may be 
room for endogeneity between ωt-1 and the latent variable behind Sudden Stops (capital flows) 
due to unobserved and persistent characteristics common to both variables.  Such would be the 
case of variables proxying credibility or political factors.  To tackle this potential endogeneity 
problem, we carried out a Rivers-Vuong test on the estimations previously presented in 
Appendix Tables 4 and 5.
46 Based on the results of this test (see Appendix Tables 6 and 7), we 
cannot reject the presence of endogeneity since the residuals obtained in the first stage of this 
method appear to be significant.
47  Therefore, in order to assess the significance of all variables 
included in the estimations in the presence of endogeneity, we need to construct appropriate 
measures of the standard deviation of their coefficient estimators, as standard test statistics are no 
longer valid. In order to do this, and given the presence of random effects, we rely on a non-
parametric hierarchical two-step bootstrap methodology.  Random effects introduce an intra-
                                                 
46 Probit models can be reduced to latent variable models.  For this particular case where endogeneity in ω is 
suspected, a system of two equations can be defined, one representing the latent variable behind the Sudden Stop 
variable (which is assumed to be a linear function of all variables in the Probit, including ω), the other representing 
ω, which is considered to be a linear function of all other variables included in the Probit estimation, as well as a lag 
in ω.  Residuals from this second regression are included in the Probit regression to determine their significance.  If 
the latter are significant, endogeneity cannot be rejected. For further details, see Rivers and Vuong (1988), or 
Wooldridge (2002). 
47 In the first stage, we used all the other explanatory variables in the corresponding equation and the second lag of 
ω as instruments of the potentially endogenous variable (ωt-1). 
  27group correlation structure among observations.  This is accounted for by first randomly 
sampling countries with replacements, and, in a second stage, randomly sampling without 
replacement within the countries sampled in the first stage.  According to Davison and Hinkley 
(1997), this procedure closely mimics the intra-group correlation structure of the data mentioned 
above (see the Technical Appendix for a detailed explanation).  Confidence intervals are 
computed using the percentile method at a 5 percent significance level, based on 500 
replications. 
Using bootstrapped confidence intervals, we confirm that both 1-ω and domestic liability 
dollarization remain significant at the 5 percent level even after controlling for endogeneity.  
Results for the whole sample of countries are reported in Appendix Table 6.  It is worth 
considering that, in particular, the coefficient accompanying 1-ω increases substantially 
compared to results shown in Appendix Table 4, indicating that the relevance of 1-ω increases 
once controlling for endogeneity.
48  This can be seen graphically by replicating panel (A) of 
Figure 4 with the new estimates, to show that the non-linear effect of ω on the probability of a 
Sudden Stop increases compared to previous estimates that do not control for endogeneity (panel 
B of Figure 4). 
 
Further Addressing Endogeneity for EMS.  Results for 1-ω and domestic liability dollarization 
remain significant at the 5 percent level when we apply a Rivers-Vuong correction to the EM 
country sample.  One additional interesting result emerges after controlling for endogeneity: 
Terms of trade growth becomes a significant variable throughout our set of estimations (see 
Appendix Table 7), with a negative coefficient indicating that decreases in terms of trade growth 
increase the likelihood of a Sudden Stop.  This result is consistent with the case made by 
Caballero and Panageas (2003) that in countries where commodities are relevant, a fall in 
commodity prices may be accompanied by a Sudden Stop, thus amplifying the original shock. 
 
Linear Probability Model Estimation.  To check the robustness of our results, we also estimate a 
linear probability model.  Despite its limitations,
49 this approach lets us control for endogeneity 
                                                 
48 None of the previous point estimates of the coefficient accompanying 1-ω in Appendix Table 4 fall within the 
confidence interval shown in Appendix Table 6.  
49 Such as the fact that probability is not necessarily constrained to the [0,1] interval.   
  28using standard two stages least squares
50 techniques, and it is amenable to the introduction of 
fixed effects to capture country-specific differences.
51 The results obtained (see Appendix Tables 
8 and 9) show that the previous results remain valid: both 1-ω and the degree of DLD are 
significant determinants of the probability of a Sudden Stop at the 5 percent confidence level in 
most specifications, both for our full sample and for the sample of EMs only.  For the EM group, 
terms-of-trade growth does show up as a significant variable at the 10 percent significance level.  
Interestingly, the coefficient accompanying exchange rate regime measures does come up 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level, implying that, controlling for dollarization, fixed 
exchange rate regimes may increase the likelihood of a Sudden Stop.  However, these results are 
not robust to the Rivers-Vuong specification shown earlier (see Appendix Tables 8 and 9). 
Another relevant robustness check is that an interaction term between 1-ω and DLD 
comes up significant in the linear estimation, both for the whole sample as well as for EMs only, 
confirming results shown with Probit analysis indicating that the combination of dollarization 
and low values of ω can be dangerous in terms of amplifying the probability of a Sudden Stop. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Focusing on the characteristics and determinants of large capital flow reversals for a set of EMs 
and developed countries, we obtained a few key suggestive empirical findings that open up 
several areas of research.  We summarize them as follows:  
 
•  Large RER fluctuations accompanied by Sudden Stops are basically an EM 
phenomenon.  In contrast, developed countries can sustain large depreciations 
while keeping their capital account open. 
•  Sudden Stops seem to come in bunches, grouping together countries that are 
different in many respects, such as fiscal stance and monetary and exchange 
rate arrangements. However, countries are similar in that they remain 
vulnerable to large RER fluctuations. This may occur because countries are 
                                                 
50 As in the Rivers-Vuong estimation, we use all other variables previously included in the Probit as well as the 
second lag of ω as instruments of the potentially endogenous variable (ωt-1). 
51 A control that cannot be applied to the panel Probit estimation without a significant loss in observations. 
  29forced to make large adjustments in the absorption of tradable goods, and/or 
because dollar liabilities play a large role in the banking system. 
•  This particular type of bunching suggests that when analyzing Sudden Stops, 
careful consideration should be given to financial vulnerabilities to external 
shocks, rather than to arguments relying only on unsustainable domestic 
policies that may exhibit sharp reversals. 
•  Sudden Stops are accompanied by large interest rate upswings, reserve losses 
and large current account adjustment, suggesting that these phenomena are 
associated with shifts in the supply of capital flows. 
•  Openness, understood as a large supply of tradable goods relative to 
absorption of tradable goods, and Domestic Liability Dollarization, are key 
determinants of the probability of a Sudden Stop. 
•  Both Openness and the structure of Balance Sheets are the result of domestic 
policies.  Countries may be tested by foreign creditors, but vulnerability to 
Sudden Stops is purely due to domestic factors, such as tariff and 
competitiveness policies affecting the supply of tradable goods, and badly 
managed fiscal and monetary policies that result in Domestic Liability 
Dollarization. 
•  The effect of Openness and Liability Dollarization on the probability of a 
Sudden Stop could be highly non-linear.  In particular, high current account 
leverage and high Domestic Liability Dollarization could be a dangerous 
cocktail. 
 
Although our work has established the empirical relevance of balance-sheet effects on the 
likelihood of Sudden Stops, it does not cover another topic that represents an important extension 
of research, namely, the consequences of Sudden Stops and balance sheet effects on economic 
growth, particularly in dollarized economies.
52  We leave this significant topic for future analysis. 
                                                 
52 Relevant work in this direction has recently been conducted by Edwards (2003).   
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  33Appendix Table 1. AR(1) Coefficients of Changes in the Trade Balance  
(in absolute value) 
 
Emerging  
Markets 
Developed   
Economies 
Argentina  0.170  Australia  0.506 
Brazil  0.305  Canada  0.487 
Chile  0.373  Denmark  0.540 
Colombia  0.386  Finland  0.487 
Czech Rep.  0.585  France  0.479 
Ecuador  0.431  Germany  0.477 
Indonesia  0.413  Italy  0.536 
Korea  0.445  Japan  0.454 
Mexico  0.230  Netherlands  0.481 
Nigeria  0.302  Norway  0.502 
Peru  0.374  New Zealand  0.500 
Philippines  0.383  Portugal  0.475 
South Africa  0.558  Spain  0.518 
Thailand  0.431  Sweden  0.541 
Turkey  0.340  Switzerland  0.505 
    
United 
Kingdom  0.473 
     United States  0.456 
Min.  0.170  Min.  0.454 
Max.  0.585  Max.  0.541 
Average  0.382  Average  0.495 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2. Costless Capital Flow Reversals Statistics 
In % of Total 
 Emerging 
Markets 
Developed 
Economies 
Associated with an Increase in Terms of Trade  62  60 
Not Associated with an Increase in Terms of Trade  38  40 
 
Note: The total number of costless capital flow reversals is 26 in emerging markets and 30 in 
developed economies. 
  34Appendix Table 3. Trough to Peak Differences in a Two-Year Window  
Centered on the Beginning of a Sudden Stop, Selected Variables 
 
 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
Real Foreign 
Reserves 
Real Interest 
Rates 
  (% of GDP)  (% change)  (%) 
Argentina-94 1.40 -40.95  20.36 
Argentina-99 1.75 -14.17  0.97 
Argentina-01 13.43  -48.61  48.05 
Chile-98* 4.57  -22.30  24.15 
Colombia-98 6.24 -18.29  36.28 
Czech Republic-97  4.94  -33.44  13.97 
Ecuador-99* 15.63  -72.90  10.37 
Germany-93 -0.43  -43.03  1.05 
Indonesia-97 7.41 -24.48  102.16 
Japan-97 1.62  -10.68  3.88 
Korea-97 17.15  -41.14  21.49 
Mexico-94 5.25  -85.16  56.07 
Peru-97* 0.58  -6.58  11.03 
Philippines-97 6.85  -31.54 20.20 
Portugal-92 1.19  -40.53  11.71 
Spain-92 2.48  -44.12  3.69 
Sweden-92 0.57  -35.52  68.79 
Thailand-96 5.82  -37.22  17.34 
Turkey-94 2.44  -53.06  132.08 
Turkey-98 0.41  -10.94  23.31 
Turkey-01 4.04  -34.89  209.02 
Emerging Markets  6.12  -35.98  46.68 
Developed Economies  1.09  -34.78  17.82 
Overall sample  4.92  -35.69  39.81 
 
*Due to lack of data on money market rates, lending rates were used instead. 
 
  35Appendix Table 4. Panel PROBIT, All Countries 
Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator 
 
                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1-ϖ   5.193             
               
   
             
   
             
          
        
        
        
             
         
        
            
        
          
        
          
        
         
        
          
        
               
             
 
4.812 4.915 4.745 4.825 4.818 6.099
(1.836)***
 
(1.834)***
 
(1.841)***
 
(1.842)***
 
(1.849)***
 
(1.848)***
 
(2.402)**
DLD
 
7.924 7.009 6.948 6.961 7.106 7.104 7.513
(2.183)***
 
(2.255)***
 
(2.267)***
 
(2.275)***
 
(2.292)***
 
(2.290)***
 
(3.090)**
EM  Dummy
 
0.460 0.463 0.473 0.444 0.443 0.174
(0.403) (0.405) (0.396) (0.398) (0.398) (0.586)
TOT  Growth
 
-1.383 -1.369 -1.380 -1.371 -1.857
(2.220) (2.212) (2.216) (2.218) (2.299)
Total Debt over 
Revenues 
 
0.014 0.009 0.009 0.026
(0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.131)
Ex.  Regime 3
 
0.028
(0.165)
Ex. Regime 5 
 
          0.019  0.001 
(0.109) (0.130)
Reserves  over CAD
 
-0.003
(0.006)
M2  over  Reserves
 
-0.036
(0.031)
Credit  Growth
 
-1.919
(1.341)
FDI/GDP
 
-1.372
(9.096)
Public  Balance/GDP
 
2.382
(6.386)
Constant
 
-3.393 -3.550 -3.558 -3.563 -3.599 -3.610 -3.154
(0.762)***
 
(0.790)***
 
(0.788)***
 
(0.812)***
 
(0.876)***
 
(0.896)***
 
(1.132)***
  Observations 302 302 302 298 296 296 294
         
 
All regressions include time dummies.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  36Appendix Table 5. Panel PROBIT, Emerging Markets 
Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator 
 
              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1-ϖ   4.709           
             
             
           
           
           
      
       
           
        
          
       
         
     ( 0 . 0 1 0 )  
         
     ( 0 . 0 5 9 )  
G r o w t h        - 1 . 0 6 7  
     ( 1 . 1 5 5 )  
         
      . 2 2 7 ) *  
         
     ( 5 . 0 0 9 )  
             
           
 
4.979 4.546 5.102 4.994 5.690
(2.127)** (2.148)** (2.089)** (2.226)** (2.180)** (2.240)**
  DLD
 
4.719 4.638 4.604 5.006 4.911 4.073
(1.949)**
 
(1.970)** (1.917)** (2.141)** (2.125)** (1.623)**
  TOT  Growth
 
-1.801 -1.759 -1.639 -1.568 -2.514
(2.253)
 
(2.250) (2.246) (2.249) (2.336)
Total Debt over 
Revenues 
 
-0.098 -0.118 -0.105 -0.087
(0.137)
 
(0.149) (0.146) (0.130)
Ex.  Regime 3
 
0.359
(0.239)
  Ex.  Regime 5
 
0.222 0.134
(0.155) (0.125)
Reserves  over CAD
 
  0.014
M2  over  Reserves
 
-0.068
C r e d i t  
 
FDI/GDP
 
-18.102
( 1 0
Public  Balance/GDP
 
-3.027
Constant
 
-2.630 -2.651 -2.424 -3.155 -3.234 -2.117
(0.726)***
 
(0.721)***
 
(0.755)***
 
(0.969)***
 
(1.019)***
 
(0.834)**
  Observations 138 138 134 134 134 132
        
 
All regressions include time dummies.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  37Appendix Table 6. Panel PROBIT, Rivers and Vuong Approach, All Countries 
Dependent Variable:  Sudden Stop Indicator 
Estimates and Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals 
 
                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Residuals                -12.654** -12.590** -14.154** -14.100** -14.053** -13.912** -18.700**
  [-25.5, -3.8]  [-30.1, -4.5]  [-34.5, -3.8]  [-354, -4.5]  [-40.1, -4.7]  [-44.3, -4.5]  [-72.1, -5.3] 
1-ϖ   17.909**             
               
             
             
           
           
             
             
           
          
            
          
            
          
          
            
          
          
               
         
17.722** 19.597** 19.040** 19.014** 18.743** 24.471**
  [9.8, 35.6]  [9.2, 40.3]  [9.6, 48.8]  [8.1, 45.8]  [9.7, 57.2]  [9.7, 57.0]  [10.0, 100.9] 
DLD 10.569** 10.831** 10.665** 10.651** 10.766** 10.672** 12.070**
  [6.2, 20.8] 
 
[6.0, 23.9]  [5.6, 28.6]  [5.8, 25.1]  [6.3, 26.7]  [6.2, 27.6]  [6.5, 50.8] 
EM  Dummy -0.054 -0.081 -0.141 -0.170 -0.157 -1.622
    [-1.4, 2.3] 
 
[-1.7, 2.1]  [-1.4, 2.5]  [-1.8, 2.5]  [-1.8, 3.0]  [-5.7, 2.5] 
TOT  Growth -4.436 -4.612 -4.581 -4.581 -4.369
      [-15.3, 2.4]  [-16.4, 1.8]  [-16.8, 2.4]  [-16.8, 1.9]  [-13.1, 5.4] 
Total Debt over Revenues        -0.111  -0.118  -0.121  -0.121 
        [-1.1, 0.3] 
 
[-1.2, 0.4]  [-1.4, 0.4] 
 
[-1.5, 0.7] 
Ex.  Regime 3
 
0.022
[-0.5, 0.9]
Ex.  Regime 5
 
0.035 -0.091
[-0.4, 0.7]
 
[-0.5, 1.0]
Reserves  over CAD
 
-0.004
[-0.01, 0.03]
M2  over Reserves
 
-0.132**
[-0.6, -0.03]
Credit Growth
 
-1.539
[-13.5, 1.7]
FDI/GDP -5.532
[-55.3, 24.5]
Public  Balance/GDP
 
25.875
[-2.6, 80.1]
Constant -4.055** -4.065** -4.229** -3.872** -3.857** -3.893** -1.514
  [-7.1, -2.8]  [-8.2, -2.9]  [-9.0, -2.8]  [-8.8, -2.7]  [-10.6, -2.7] 
 
[-11.4, -2.8] 
 
[-13.5, 0.6] 
Observations 302 302 302 298 296 296 294 
         
 
** Significant at the 5 percent level using bootstrapped confidence intervals constructed by the percentile method, shown in brackets. 
 
Note: Larger models, including several variables, show wide confidence intervals.  Instability in the random effects estimator may arise when 
the dimension of the problem is increased and the number of individual observations is low (Guilkey and Murphy, 1993).  These facts point 
towards keeping the dimension of the model relatively low.  Yet, even for the more problematic cases, both 1-ω and DLD remain significant at 
the 5 percent level.  
  38Appendix Table 7. Panel PROBIT, Rivers and Vuong Approach, Emerging Economies 
Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator 
Estimates and Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals 
 
              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Residuals              -19.480** -22.569** -24.485** -27.164** -28.273** -22.988**
  [-71.3, -8.3]  [-97.1, -9.3]  [-103.6, -11.1]  [-144.8, -11.7]  [-173.2, -16.0]  [-422.5, -14.8] 
1-ϖ   23.790**     
           
           
        
          
          
            
          
      . 0 0 4 ,   1 . 6 ]  
           
         
           
         
         
           
         
         
           
 
27.131** 28.433** 31.704** 32.777** 23.984** 
  [13.5, 92.2]  [16.4, 119.6]  [17.8, 144.5]  [19.3, 181.6]  [19.8, 201.2]  [18.5, 5548.5] 
  DLD 10.149** 9.816** 9.725** 10.822** 11.001** 6.877**
  [7.1, 30.7] 
 
[6.2, 39.0]  [6.3, 44.0]  [6.7, 52.6]  [6.8, 62.7]  [4.8, 1393.9] 
TOT  Growth -7.077** -7.621** -8.502** -8.663** -7.512**
    [-31.5, -1.0]  [-36.6, -1.4]  [-43.1, -2.0]  [-54.6, -3.1]  [-1500.5, -1.0] 
Total Debt over Revenues      -0.258  -0.301  -0.300  -0.303 
      [-1.7, 0.1] 
 
[-2.0, 0.1]  [-2.3, 0.2] 
 
[-47.2, 0.1] 
  Ex.  Regime 3
 
0.305
[-0.2, 2.1]
  Ex.  Regime 5
 
0.210 0.029
[-0.2, 1.4]
 
[-0.4, 30.9]
Reserves  over CAD
 
0.009**
[ 0
M2  over Reserves
 
-0.018
[-2.3, 1.5]
Credit Growth
 
-2.000
[-513.0, 0.1]
FDI/GDP -14.165
[-183.3, 535.8]
Public  Balance/GDP
 
-6.453
[-936.2, 64.5]
  Constant -3.563** -3.735** -3.282** -4.122** -4.365 -2.159
  [-11.5, -2.8] 
 
[-14.1, -2.9] 
 
[-15.6, -2.4] 
 
[-23.6, -2.7] 
 
[-27.4, -2.8] 
 
[-512.9, -1.0] 
  Observations 138 138 134 134 134 132
        
 
** Significant at the 5 percent level using bootstrapped confidence intervals constructed by percentile method, shown in 
brackets. 
 
Note: Larger models, including several variables, show wide confidence intervals.  Instability in the random effects estimator 
may arise when the dimension of the problem is increased and the number of individual observations is low (Guilkey and 
Murphy, 1993).  These facts point towards keeping the dimension of the model relatively low.  Yet, even for the more 
problematic cases, both 1-ω and DLD remain significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
  39Appendix Table 8. Linear Probability Model with Fixed Effects,  
Two-Stage Estimation, All Countries 
Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator 
 
              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1-ϖ )  1.148           
             
           
           
1.260 1.290 1.376 1.374 1.385
(0.457)** (0.481)***
 
(0.507)** (0.532)** (0.535)** (0.543)**
DLD
 
1.722 1.674 1.628 1.818 1.818 2.009
(0.424)*** (0.428)*** (0.454)*** (0.450)*** (0.450)*** (0.465)***
(1-ϖ )*DLD  4.486 4.459 4.211 4.366 4.322 4.610 
             
           
           
           
        
           
       
           
       
         
       
         
       
         
       
         
       
             
           
             
             
(1.773)**
 
(1.773)** (1.807)** (1.813)** (1.815)** (1.871)**
TOT  Growth
 
-0.541 -0.568 -0.615 -0.615 -0.500
(0.365) (0.371) (0.378) (0.380) (0.373)
Total Debt over Revenues 
 
    -0.027  -0.032  -0.032  -0.027 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Ex. Regime 3 
 
      0.017     
(0.030)
Ex.  Regime 5
 
0.012 0.013
(0.020) (0.021)
Reserves  over CAD
 
-0.001
(0.001)
M2  over  Reserves
 
-0.007
(0.003)**
Credit  Growth
 
-0.196
(0.103)*
FDI/GDP
 
0.534
(0.883)
Public  Balance/GDP
 
1.458
(0.812)*
Constant
 
-0.113 -0.110 -0.048 -0.079 -0.086 0.017
(0.059)* (0.059)* (0.084) (0.097) (0.102) (0.117)
Observations 302 302 298 296 296 294
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.27
        
 
All regressions include time dummies.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  41Appendix Table 9. Linear Probability Model with Fixed Effects 
Two-Stage Estimation, Emerging Markets 
Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop Indicator 
 
          (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)
     
(1-ϖ )  2.396           
       
   
       
2.736 2.877 2.794 2.731 2.076
(1.011)**  (1.111)**  (1.203)** (1.250)**  (1.267)** (1.331)
DLD 1.837  1.885  1.712  1.749  1.735  1.272
(0.663)***  (0.666)***  (0.724)** (0.717)**  (0.720)** (0.732)*
(1-ϖ )* DLD  4.351         
     
        
         
          
        
       
       
        
            
        
       
   
     
             
       
4.359 4.379 4.607 4.529 6.645
(2.508)*  (2.511)*  (2.621)* (2.579)*  (2.583)*  (2.831)**
TOT Growth    -1.110  -1.178  -1.125  -1.106  -0.805 
(0.600)*  (0.628)* (0.633)*  (0.639)* (0.682)
Total Debt over Revenues 
 
    -0.025  -0.024  -0.023  0.002 
(0.046) (0.046)  (0.046) (0.051)
Ex. Regime 3        0.100     
  (0.055)*
Ex. Regime 5          0.058  0.088 
  (0.037)  (0.037)**
Reserves over CAD 
 
          -0.000 
    (0.001)
M2 over Reserves 
 
          0.003 
    (0.008)
Credit Growth            -0.864 
    (0.305)***
FDI/GDP 2.385
    (2.676)
Public Balance/GDP 
 
          1.210 
    (1.837)
Constant -0.313  -0.350  -0.290  -0.457  -0.458  -0.500
(0.137)**  (0.144)**  (0.153)*  (0.170)*** (0.175)**  (0.188)***
Observations 138 138 134 134 134 132
R-squared 0.34 0.35 0.35  0.38  0.38  0.42
      
 
All regressions include time dummies.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
  42Data Appendix 
 
Our sample of EMs consists of those countries tracked by JP Morgan’s Emerging Market 
Outlook (which includes the subset of countries used in the calculation of the EMBI+ index), i.e., 
EMs that significantly participate in world capital markets.  Countries with missing information 
on their monthly trade balance, or which do not report quarterly capital account information (a 
measure we used to check the accuracy of our monthly proxy in mimicking quarterly 
fluctuations) were dropped from the sample.  The complete list of EMs included therefore 
consists of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, Korea, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa.  Our choice of 
developed countries is dictated by OECD membership, and it includes Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA.  Data is collected on an annual basis 
unless otherwise stated. 
 
Variable Definitions  and  Sources 
Capital Flows Proxy  Trade balance minus changes in international reserves (monthly). 
All figures are expressed in 1995 US dollars.  Source: IMF, IFS. 
Absorption of tradable goods 
(Z) 
Imports plus tradable output domestically consumed, proxied by 
the sum of agricultural and industrial output minus exports.  More 
specifically, we construct the share of tradable output in total 
output as the ratio of agriculture plus industrial output to total 
GDP at constant prices.  Next, we multiply this share by total 
dollar GDP to obtain the dollar value of tradable output.  We do 
this in order to avoid excessive fluctuations in output composition 
due to valuation effects that are present in sectoral data at current 
prices.  Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
CAD  Current account deficit. Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) database. 
Financial  Dollarization  For developed economies: BIS reporting banks’ local asset 
positions in foreign currency as a share of GDP (since data for 
Australia and New Zealand are not available from this source, we 
used data from their respective Central Banks). For emerging 
economies: dollar deposits obtained from Honohan and Shi (2002) 
(and complemented with data from Central Banks for the cases of 
Colombia, Korea, Brazil) plus bank foreign borrowing (IMF, IFS 
banking institutions line 26c) as a share of GDP. 
Total Public Debt  Data on public debt for developed economies was obtained from 
OECD. Data on public debt for EMs were obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (WDI). 
  43(For a few cases, data from Central Banks and JP Morgan were 
used when not available from WDI).  Data refer to gross central 
government debt. 
External  Public  Debt  Data on external debt for developed economies were obtained 
from OECD (for a few cases, it was complemented with data from 
IMF IFS). Data on external debt for EMs were obtained from WDI 
(for a few cases, data from Central Banks were used when not 
available in WDI). 
TOT growth  Annual rate of change of terms of trade on goods and services. 
Source: IMF’s WEO database. 
Ex. Regime 3  3-way exchange regime classification: 1 = float; 2 = intermediate 
(dirty, dirty/crawling peg); 3 = fix. Source: Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) 
Ex. Regime 5  5-way exchange regime classification: 1 = inconclusive; 2 = float; 
3 = dirty; 4 = dirty/crawling peg; 5 = fix. Source: Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) 
Credit growth  Annual rate of change on the credit to private sector to GDP ratio. 
Source: IMF, IFS. 
Deposit rates  Source: IMF, IFS. 
FDI  Net foreign direct investment. Source: IMF’s WEO database. 
Fiscal Revenue  General Government Revenues. Source: IMF’s WEO database. 
GDP  Gross domestic product. Source: IMF’s WEO database. 
Lending rates  Source: IMF IFS. 
M2  Money plus quasi-money. Source: IMF, IFS. 
Money market rates  Source: IMF IFS. 
Public Balance  General government balance to GDP ratio. Source: IMF’s WEO 
database. 
Large RER depreciation 
dummy 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a large rise on 
RER (vis-à-vis US dollar) occurs and 0, otherwise. We define a 
rise in the RER (i.e., real depreciation of the currency) to be large 
when it exceeds two standard deviations of the sample mean 
prevailing before the rise.  We also impose that the rise be of at 
least 20 percent, in order to ensure we capture episodes of 
substantial depreciation.  This is particularly important for some 
developed countries where two standard deviation changes may 
not be big enough in size so as to make balance sheet effects play 
a relevant role. 
Reserves  International reserves. Source: IMF, IFS. 
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This note is concerned with estimation and inference in a random effects Probit specification 
allowing for possibly endogenous explanatory variables. The standard random effects Probit 
model with exogenous explanatory variables is: 
 
y*it = xitβ + + eit    i=1,2, … , n;  t=1,2, …,T 
 
where xit is a k vector of exogenous explanatory variables, β is a k vector of coefficients, µ is 
IN(0,σ
2
µ), and eit  is IN(0, σ
2
e). The observed binary random variable yit is related to the model 
through: 
 
yit = 1[y*it >0] 
 
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of this model is extensively studied in Heckman 
(1981) and reviewed in Hsiao (2003). The likelihood function for this problem is given by: 
 
 
 
where ρ = σ
2
µ / σ
2
e. The evaluation of the integral in the previous expression is not trivial and it is 
usually carried out through Hermite integration or simulation.  
Guilkey and Murphy (1993) conducted an extensive Monte Carlo experiment to study the 
small sample behavior of alternative estimation strategies of the random effects Probit model. 
The most important results that are relevant for this study are summarized below: 
1.  Standard probit and MLE of the random effects Probit provide consistent 
estimation of β. 
2.  The standard Probit estimator of the standard errors of the estimators is 
markedly downward biased, leading to incorrect inferences, in the sense of 
suggesting significant coefficients when in fact they are not. 
3.  The random effects MLE based estimator provides more accurate estimators 
of the standard errors but the gain in performance is relatively mild when 
compared to that of the standard Probit. 
                                                 
53 Universidad de San Andrés, Victoria, Argentina. Martín Cicowiez provided excellent computing support. 
  454.  For small individual observations (N around 25), the numerical accuracy 
problems involved in the evaluation of the integral in (1) severely affect the 
performance of the procedure, invalidating the use of standard asymptotic 
approximations. 
 
The possibility of allowing for endogenous explanatory variables has been studied in the 
context of the standard Probit model: 
 
y*j = zj γ+ xj'β + uj       j=1,2,…,J 
 
where uj is IN(0, σ
2
e), and xj, β and y*j are defined as in the previous model. zj is a possibly 
endogenous explanatory variable. Rivers and Vuong (1988) provide a simple estimation strategy 
for the case where: 
 
zj = x
*
j' δ + vj 
 
and (uj, vj) have a bivariate normal distribution independent of x*j. x*j is a vector of exogenous 
explanatory variables in the reduced form model for zj, which in this context is “endogenous” if 
and only if uj and vj are correlated. Rivers and Vuong (1988) propose a consistent estimation
54 
based on a two-step approach: 
 
• 
• 
                                                
Step 1: Run the OLS regression of zj on x*j and save residuals v*j. 
 
Step 2: Run a standard Probit regression of yj on xj, zj and v*j. 
 
 
Details of the procedure can be checked in the original reference and in Wooldridge 
(2002). The main intuition behind the result comes from the fact that under bivariate normality of 
u and v, we can write u = θv + η where η is independent of x* and v. Then, replacing in the 
definition of y*: 
 
y*j = zj γ + xj’β + θ vj +ηi 
 
If vj were observable, consistent estimation could proceed by a standard Probit regression 
of yj on zj, xj and vj, since, by construction, all explanatory variables are exogenous with respect 
 
54 It is important to remark that, as is usual in binary choice index models, not all the parameters are identified, 
hence appropriate normalizations must be adopted. See Rivers and Vuong (1988) for details on this subject. 
  46to ηj. The first stage of the Rivers-Vuong procedure replaces vj by a consistent estimate obtained 
from OLS regression in a first stage. 
The performance of the Rivers and Vuong (1988) procedure in the context of the random 
effects specification has not been explored, and though it deserves a more detailed exploration 
than the one offered here, some insights can be discussed. A simple extension in the panel 
context is to allow for endogenous explanatory variables by allowing for correlation between the 
observation specific error term of the index model (eit) and the error term of the reduced form of 
the possibly endogenous explanatory variable (vit). In this context, the index model can be 
written as: 
 
y*it = zit γ + xit'β + θ vit + µi + ηit 
 
and, again, if vit were observable, the model should be unaltered albeit for some redefinition of 
relevant parameters.  In this case, the Rivers-Vuong procedure is replacing an exogenous 
explanatory variable (vit) with a consistent estimate obtained from a first-stage regression. 
  An important problem is how to perform reliable inference with the proposed method.  
As discussed previously, Guilkey and Murphy (1993) suggest that the numerical accuracy 
problems related to the evaluation of the likelihood function of the random effects Probit makes 
asymptotic approximations very unreliable.  A natural possibility is to consider a bootstrap 
approach.  The nature of such procedure in this context is complicated due to the fact that, by 
construction, observations are not independent due to the presence of random effect.  In this note 
we follow Davidson and Hinkley (1997) and use a non-parametric hierarchical two-step 
bootstrap strategy, where in a first stage, individuals are randomly sampled with replacements, 
and, in a second stage, observations are randomly sampled without replacement within the 
individuals sampled in the first stage.  According to Davison and Hinkley (1997, pp. 100-102), 
this procedure closely mimics the intra-group correlation structure of the data, due to the 
presence of the individual random effect. 
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